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The purpose of this paper is to compute and evaluate producers’ marginal 
abatement costs (MACs). These costs are obtained by calculating shadow prices 
of bad outputs from the production technology, which is represented by the 
estimated directional output distance function. To be more specific, this paper 
considers the Swedish pulp industry when the regulatory authority has granted 
each producing plant a maximally allowed emission level. In each case, area 
residents and other parties concerned have been allowed to express their views, 
which possibly prepared the way for other factors than prescribed by 
environmental law, to influence the stringency of the finally allowed emission 
levels and, therefore, the MACs. The main focus is on whether the calculated 
MACs reveal that differences between counties in, e.g., economical 
characteristics, were influential when the authority, during 1983-1990, restricted 
12 geographically scattered pulp plants regarding emissions. The result indicates 
that the MACs vary between many of the plants and that county differences were 
taken into account when imposing environmental restrictions on the plants. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Many types of human activities have negative side effects on the environment. 
These effects may be due to bad outputs, i.e., undesirable by-products from 
production processes. The effects are, from a societal point of view, considered 
excessive if no corrective measures are undertaken. Public authorities are 
therefore called upon to regulate the performance of polluting industries. 
Regulations, for instance, in the form of producer specific quotas that specify 
maximum levels of bad output discharges, are legislated to limit the 
environmental damages. In fulfilling these requirements, the industrial producers 
face abatement costs, which can be evaluated. The evaluation of abatement efforts 
may expose information that is useful. Such information can be obtained by 
computing the producers’ marginal abatement costs (MACs), or shadow prices, of 
bad outputs. This is at the core of this paper.  
 
Computed bad output shadow prices can be used for several purposes; (a) since 
these prices become visible and are interpreted as MACs, producers may be 
informed about these prices. Each producer then gets an indication of her/his 
abatement efforts in comparison with that of others. If markets for pollution rights 
exist, the producers can also use the MAC information to determine whether it is 
worthwhile to buy or sell rights; (b) traditional productivity measures can be 
extended to include polluting emissions when analyzing productivity growth of 
producing plants, sectors, or countries; (c) one can study whether the existing 
environmental regulations are cost efficient, i.e., whether they are imposed so that 
environmental goals are achieved at minimum abatement cost to society; (d) one 
can analyze why MACs may vary between producers, in purpose to more 
thoroughly understand the environmental policy in effect. Earlier studies on this 
subject, overviewed in Section 3, have mainly focused on the first three purposes, 
while this paper mainly focuses on the last. 
 
Specifically, producers’ MACs are studied in order to find out which factors that 
may have influenced the pursued environmental policy in Sweden. In particular, 
the pulp and paper industry is under study. To limit the emissions into water, the 
environmental authority has granted each production plant permits that specify Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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maximally allowed emission levels. During the handling of each such case, area 
residents and other parties concerned have been allowed to express their views, 
which may have created possibilities for other factors than those regulated by the 
environmental legislation to influence the granted permits and, therefore, the 
MACs. By studying the MACs, this paper seeks the answer to whether regional 
differences mattered when environmental regulations were imposed on 12 
geographically scattered Swedish pulp plants during 1983-1990.  
 
As a first step, shadow prices, reflecting MACs of bad outputs, are estimated for 
each pulp plant and compared to each other through non-parametric tests to 
establish whether MACs vary significantly between plants. The approach adopted 
to compute these prices originates from Färe et al. (2002), where bad outputs are 
treated differently compared to earlier studies discussed in Section 3. The model 
is founded on production theory where the technology is represented by the 
directional output distance function, from which the shadow prices are derived. 
The distance function is specified using a quadratic flexible functional form and 
computed by a linear programming technique. In a second step, the computed 
MACs are regressed on a set of variables in an attempt to explain why MACs may 
vary across plants. In this paper, hypotheses concerning variables that vary 
between regions, such as tax base, population density, employment in the pulp 
and paper industry, and unemployment, are suggested. Also, fixed and time 
specific effects are included.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section a background to the issue at 
study is given. Section 3 provides an overview of the development of bad output 
shadow-pricing models. The theoretical framework including the underlying 
production technology, the directional output distance function, and the shadow-
pricing model is provided in Section 4. In Section 5 the empirical model is given. 
First, the directional output distance functional form and the technique to estimate 
this form is provided. Then, a model for testing why MACs vary is suggested. 
Data are described in Section 6, and the empirical results are presented in Section 
7. Finally, Section 8 summarizes and concludes.  
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2 BACKGROUND 
A substantial part of the emissions into the Gulf of Bothnia, the Bothnian Sea, and 
the Baltic Sea originates from the Swedish pulp and paper industry. To ensure a 
better quality of these waters, the National Licensing Board for Environment 
Protection, NLBEP, has imposed emission standards in the form of non-tradable 
permits on the production plants.
1 During the time period under study, 1983-1990, 
the NLBEP was a central government authority that assessed environmentally 




The pulp and paper plants were obliged to apply for permits when they wished to 
increase production or alter emission quotas. The applications were sent to the 
NLBEP, which, in a manner of court procedure, assessed whether the plants were 
allowed to make these alterations. However, before the NLBEP granted a permit, 
the received application was sent on to other authorities and organizations for 
review. The Environmental Protection Agency, the County Administrative Board, 
the Municipal Environment and Health Protection Committee were allowed to 
comment on all cases. Also, regional and local agents, e.g., residents, politicians, 
and industry and plant representatives were given the opportunity to express their 
opinions. When the written investigation of a plant was completed, the NLBEP 
held an on-site meeting and inspection of the plant. These meetings were 
advertised in advance in local newspapers, and were open to all who considered 
themselves affected.  
 
Factors that the NLBEP were prescribed to take into consideration in the granting 
procedure were provided by the Environment Protection Act. In practice, the 
plants’ technological possibilities of abating and the sensitivity to emissions in the  
                                                 
1 The National Licensing Board for Environment Protection (2003). 
2 The Environment Protection Act is no longer in effect. The Environmental Code (Miljöbalken, 
1998:808) applies from January 1, 1999, where differently aimed Acts, including the 
Environment Protection Act, have been co-coordinated. At the same time, five environmental 
courts, located in the cities of Stockholm, Umeå, Vänersborg, Växjö, and Östersund replaced the 
NLBEP. However, in general, the Environmental Code and the introduction of new courts have 
not altered the procedure of granting non-tradable emission permits (The Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2003). Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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affected surrounding environment were considered. This means that all other 
economic factors, private as well as social, were not supposed to be considered. 
All plants, independently of geographical location, were supposed to be treated 
equally in context of the Environment Protection Act.
3  
 
The procedure of letting area residents and other parties express their views could 
create an opening for other economic factors to influence the procedure of 
granting non-tradable emission permits. For instance, for plants in review that are 
located in high unemployment areas, it may be argued that society benefits from 
less stringent environmental restrictions if this implies that the plants can keep up, 
or even increase, the employment rate. In this case, society faces a trade-off 
between employment and environmental quality that should be optimized. This 
means that plants located in such areas may face lower MACs of bad outputs. 
This paper addresses this and similar issues by statistically testing whether there 
are any significant relationships between regional labor market characteristics and 
the pulp plants’ MACs. Hypotheses regarding regional population density and tax 
base are also tested. 
 
Before outlining the theoretical model, including the concept of shadow-pricing of 
bad outputs, an overview of the development of the estimation of bad output 
shadow prices is provided in the next section.
4  
 
3 SHADOW-PRICING  MODELS 
One of the first attempts to analyze producer environmental performance from an 
estimated bad output shadow price was made by Pittman (1981). He studied 30 
pulp and paper plants in Wisconsin and Michigan in 1976. The purpose was partly 
to investigate whether the pollution control requirements, set by the authorities, 
were cost efficient. Pittman specified a restricted profit maximization problem 
where one of the restrictions was plant specific quotas specifying maximum 
allowed levels of biological oxygen demand (BOD) discharge into the waters. The  
                                                 
3 The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2003). 
4 Readers not interested may go directly to Section 4. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Lagrange multiplier of that restriction, reflecting the shadow price, or the MAC, 
of BOD, was then econometrically estimated in a system of equations. This means 
that Pittman assumed that each plant discharged exactly as much BOD as it was 
allowed to. One of the findings was that the shadow price differed substantially 
between plants and it was interpreted such that the pollution control regulations 
allocated abatement resources inefficiently. A conclusion was, therefore, that 
either an effluent charge or a market for transferable discharge permits would 
potentially result in a more efficient resource allocation. A striking feature of the 
Pittman model is that the pollutant BOD is treated in the same way as 
conventional inputs. Pittman (1983) presented an alternative use of bad output 
shadow prices, where the estimates were used in the construction of a multi-factor 
productivity index. The hypothesis was that differences in conventionally 
measured productivity (excluding information on pollutants) among different 
plants could be explained by the failure to account for pollution control behavior. 
However, his empirical results clearly rejected the hypothesis, but he found that 
productivity measures, which ignore information on pollutants, might yield 
misleading results from a societal point of view. 
 
Färe et al. (1993) characterized the structure of production technology with the 
Shephard multi-output distance function, which is dual to the revenue function. 
Using this approach, duality theory is exploited and shadow prices of outputs are 
derived from the distance function using Shephard’s dual lemma. A major 
difference compared to the Pittman approach is that emissions are here treated as 
undesirable by-products from production processes. Estimated shadow prices then 
reflect the trade-off between good and bad outputs. This means that information 
on environmental restrictions imposed on producers are not needed in this case 
and, consequently, there is no need to assume that producers are satisfying these 
requirements when estimating shadow prices. Färe et al. (1993) computed the 
output distance function on the Pittman (1981, 1983) data by employing a 
parametric linear programming technique. Their findings coincided with 
Pittman’s in the sense that shadow prices varied between plants and, given the 
plants geographical proximity, this suggested that the environmental regulations 
in effect were not allocating resources efficiently.  
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Coggins and Swinton (1996) used the Färe et al. (1993) approach to calculate the 
shadow price, or MAC, of sulfur dioxide (SO2) for 14 Wisconsin coal-burning 
electric utility plants during 1990-1992. They suggested that the shadow price 
could be interpreted as the market value of a SO2 emission allowance to the plants 
in the study. Coggins and Swinton noted that the estimated sample average 
shadow price was close to prices at which actual trades between utilities had 
occurred, and that the shadow price varied widely across the sample. This 
variability was further confirmed by Swinton (1999), who pointed out that the 
variability also highlighted a dramatic difference in MACs among plants using 
different abatement strategies, as installing scrubber capital or purchasing low-
sulfur fuel.  
 
Reig-Martínez et al. (2001) used the Färe et al. (1993) approach on 18 Spanish 
ceramic pavement producers in 1995. They observed that shadow prices of watery 
muds and used oil differed significantly across the sample. Due to the closely 
knitted geographical location of these producers, Reig-Martínez et al. (2001) 
found it reasonable to assume that marginal social benefits from reducing 
emissions were similar between the producers. Therefore, they concluded that the 
existing situation was not efficient in terms of allocating resources and that a 
market of emission permits could be developed. Reig-Martínez et al. (2001) used 
the calculated shadow prices to construct a labor productivity deviation index 
(PDI), which compares a conventional form of labor productivity to an extended 
form of the same. The calculated PDI showed that the conventional index 
overestimated labor productivity by 12 percent on average in terms of revenues 
per labor unit. Their major point was that producers that are less productive in 
conventional terms might be relatively productive when taking the environment 
issue into account. 
 
Färe et al. (2002) suggest a directional output distance function approach to 
calculate shadow prices of bad outputs. Unlike the Shephard output distance 
function used in the studies discussed above, which expands both good and bad 
outputs to the output frontier, this function allows for a simultaneous expansion of 
good outputs and contraction of bad outputs (see Figure 1 in Section 4). 
Consequently, this new approach will, in comparison with the Shephard approach, Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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imply different shadow prices of bad outputs. Färe et al. (2002) apply the 
approach to the U.S. agricultural sector for the period 1960-1996. They calculate 
shadow prices of two indices that capture the effects on drinking water of 
pesticides leaching into the ground water, and of pesticide runoff into the surface 
water. The resulting shadow prices are then used to calculate the pollution cost for 
leaching and for runoff. Their results indicate that these costs are significant, 
averaging about 17.5 percent of the revenues from good outputs. 
 
4 THEORY 
The shadow-pricing model adopted in this paper, which allows for the calculation 
of shadow prices of bad outputs, originates from Färe et al. (2002).
5 The 
theoretical framework that constitutes the basis of this model is founded on the 
underlying production technology, here the output possibilities set, and the 
directional output distance function, which is defined on this set. The distance 
function then inherits the properties from the output set and is, therefore, an 
adequate representative of the production technology. By exploiting the duality 
theory, the shadow-pricing model can then be derived from the distance function 
by using the envelope theorem. To begin the theoretical outline, the output 
possibilities set is first discussed. 
 
4.1  Underlying production technology 
Formally, let 
M
M y y y + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J b b b + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  be vectors of good 
outputs and bad outputs, respectively, and let 
N
N x x x + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  denote a vector 
of inputs. Then, the production technology is generally characterized by the 
output possibilities set as 
 
( )() () {} b y x b y x P ,   produce can    : , =  (1) 
 
                                                 
5 A similar shadow-pricing model was introduced already in Färe et al. (2001). However, on that 
occasion, bad outputs were not included.  Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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which further is assumed to satisfy some theoretical properties. It is assumed to be 
convex, closed and bounded, i.e. compact, with  } 0 , 0 { ) 0 ( = P . Furthermore, inputs 
are freely disposable, i.e.,  ) ( ) (  then    if x P x P x x ⊇ ′ ≥ ′ , which states that if inputs 
are changed, but not decreased, the new output set contains the original. 
 
The general idea about how to theoretically draw a distinction between good and 
bad outputs is introduced by the following technological properties. First, outputs 
are assumed to be weakly disposable, i.e.,  
 
()( ) ( ) ( ) x P b y x P b y ∈ ≤ ≤ ∈ θ θ θ ,  then  , 1 0   and   ,   if  (2) 
 
This implies that, given a fixed input vector, a reduction in any output is always 
feasible by reducing the production of all other outputs proportionally. In 
addition, good outputs are assumed to be freely disposable, i.e.,  
 
()( ) ( ) ( ) x P b y y y x P b y ∈ ′ ≤ ′ ∈ ,  then  ,   and   ,   if , (3) 
 
which means that, holding input quantities constant, a good output can always be 
reduced without reducing any other output. Thus, the theoretical distinction 
between a good and a bad output is that a good output is freely disposable, which 
is sufficient for being weakly disposable, and a bad output is only weakly 
disposable. This means that it must be costly to reduce bad outputs, holding inputs 
constant, since it has to be accomplished by reducing all good outputs, at least 
proportionally. Obviously, since the cost for reducing bad outputs then must be in 
terms of forgone revenue from good outputs, each bad output commands its own 
shadow price at the margin. In these circumstances, when defining the directional 
output distance function on the output possibilities set,  ) (x P , it appears natural to 
exploit the duality between the distance function and the revenue function, when 
deriving the shadow-pricing model. 
 
Finally, the output possibilities set satisfies the property that good outputs are 
null-joint with the bad outputs, i.e.,  
 Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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()( ) 0  then  , 0   and   ,   if = = ∈ y b x P b y . (4) 
 
This means that good outputs cannot be produced without producing bad outputs 
and, hence, the general idea of bad outputs being undesirable by-products is 
theoretically modeled. 
 
4.2  The directional output distance function 
The directional output distance function is defined on  ) (x P , as 
 
() ( ) ( ) { } x P g b g y g b y x D b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ + = β β β
β
, : max ; , ,  (5) 
 
where the solution, 
∗ β , gives the maximum expansion and contraction of good 
outputs and bad outputs, respectively. The vector  ) , ( b y g g g − =  specifies in what 
direction an output vector,  ) ( ) , ( x P b y ∈ , is scaled so as to reach the boundary of 
the output set at  ) ( ) , ( x P g b g y b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ +
∗ ∗ β β , where  ) ; , , ( g b y x D =
∗ β . The 




()( ) ( ) 0 ; , ,   if only    and   if   , ≥ ∈ g b y x D x P b y  (6) 
 
The distance function takes the value of zero for technically efficient output 
vectors on the boundary of  ) (x P , whereas positive values apply to technically 
inefficient output vectors below the boundary. The higher the value the more 
inefficient the output vector. Finally, the directional output distance function 
satisfies the translation property, i.e.,
7  
 
                                                 
6 This is valid if P(x) satisfies g-disposability, i.e., if (y,b) ∈ P(x) then (y-gy,b+gb) ∈ P(x). The 
concept of g-disposability is defined and more thoroughly discussed in Chung (1996, p. 29-34). 
7 A proof of this statement can be found in Chung (1996, p. 111). Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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( ) ( ) α α α − = ⋅ − ⋅ + g b y x D g g b g y x D b y ; , , ; , ,  (7) 
 
where α  is a positive scalar.  
 
4.3  The shadow-pricing model 
When deriving the output shadow-pricing model from the directional output 
distance function the duality between the distance function and the revenue 
function is exploited. Let 
M
M p p p + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J q q q + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  
represent prices of good and bad outputs, respectively. The revenue function is 
then defined on the underlying production technology as
8 
 
() ( ) ( ) { }
() {}  (6))   using (by  , 0 ; , , : max





g b y x D qb py





Duality means that if the revenue function is generated from the underlying 
production technology represented by the directional output distance function, as 
in (8), the directional output distance function can be recovered from the revenue 
function. This duality is formally established in Färe et al. (2002) and it is shown 
that the directional output distance function can be expressed as 
 
() ( ) ( ) () ( ) { } b y q p qg pg qb py q p x R g b y x D + − − = , , min ; , ,
,  (9) 
 
To get the explicit output shadow-pricing model, the envelope theorem is first 
applied to (9), which yields 
 
() () ( ) 0 , 0 ; , , > + ≤
+





g b y x D  (10a) 
 
                                                 
8 Note that the shadow prices, q, take non-negative values and are here considered as the cost faced 
when reducing bad outputs, b.  Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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() () ( ) 0 , 0 ; , , > + ≥
+





g b y x D  (10b) 
 
The absolute shadow prices of good and bad outputs could then be derived from 
(10a) and (10b), respectively. Unfortunately, the value of  ) ( b y qg pg +  is not 
known since it consists of the shadow prices not yet calculated. However, if it is 
assumed that at least one of the good outputs, e.g.,  m y , is sold in a perfectly 
competitive market, its observed price,  m p , can be taken to be the absolute 







g b y x D
b
g b y x D
q m
m j
j ,..., 1 ,













− =  (11) 
 
where the negative of the expression within brackets is the marginal rate of 
transformation between the  th j :  bad output and the  th m:  good output,  jm MRT . 
The shadow price  j q  then equals the revenue loss, from decreased sales of  m y , 
that has to be faced when reducing  j b  marginally. 
 
The shadow-pricing model is illustrated in Figure 1. The output possibilities set is 
given by  ) (x P  and the technically inefficient output vector  ) , ( b y  is produced. 
 
 
                                                 




Figure 1  The shadow-pricing model 
 
The directional output distance function in (5) scales  ) , ( b y  until it reaches the 
boundary of  ) (x P  at  A. This particular point has a supporting hyper plane 
interpreted as a shadow price relation, 
∗ ∗ − p q , which counts for  ) , ( b y , and can 
be calculated using the formula in (11). The illustration in Figure 1 also shows 
that the shadow price valid for the output mix  ) , ( b y  differs depending on which 
distance function that is used. For instance, the standard Shephard output distance 
function identifies the shadow price relation at point B .  
 
5  THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
5.1  The functional form of the distance function 
Following Färe et al. (2001, 2002), the directional output distance function is 
parameterized by using a (additive) quadratic flexible functional form. 
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where κ  and τ  represent producer and time specific effects, respectively. 
 
5.2   A technique for estimating the distance function 
As in Färe et al. (2001, 2002), the distance function in (12) is estimated by a linear 
programming technique.
10  Specifically, by assuming the directional vector 
) 1 ,..., 1 ; 1 ,... 1 ( 1 1 J M g − − =  the parameters in (12) are chosen to
11 
 







kt kt kt kt b y x D
11




( ) T t K k b y x D
kt kt kt kt ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , 0 1 , 1 ; , , = = ≥ −  (i) 
 
( ) T t K k y x D
kt kt kt ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , 0 1 , 1 ; 0 , , = = < −  (ii) 
 
()
M m T t K k
y
b y x D
m
kt kt kt kt
,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , 0
1 , 1 ; , ,





                                                 
10 Färe et al. (2001, 2002) refer to the work of Aigner and Chu (1968). 
11 The directional vector g = (1,-1) is chosen for the sake of simplicity. It is then not needed to be 
included in the parameterization. An alternative would be the vector g = (y,-b), which has been 
chosen when estimating the directional output distance function by non-parametric piecewise 
linear programming techniques, see, e.g., Chung et al. (1997). Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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J j T t K k
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b y x D
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The directional output distance function inherits its properties from the output 
possibilities set,  () x P . Therefore, to ensure that the functional form of the 
distance function in (12) satisfies these properties, the minimization problem in 
(13) is solved subject to restrictions (i) – (vii). The restrictions in (i) impose the 
property in (6), which constrain each producer to operate on, or below, the 
boundary of  ) (x P . The null-jointness property in (4) is imposed by the 
restrictions in (ii) and states that good outputs cannot be produced without 
producing bad outputs. This statement means that, for  0 > y , the output bundle 
) 0 , (y  is not technically feasible, which then formally can be stated as 
) ( ) 0 , ( x P y ∉  if and only if  0 ) ; 0 , , ( < g y x D . The monotonicity conditions in (10a) 
and (10b) are imposed by the restrictions in (iii) and (iv), respectively. Notice that, 
by (iii), the property in (3), i.e., free disposability of good outputs, is satisfied. 
This property can equivalently be stated as:    implies   y y ≤ ′  
) ; , , ( ) ; , , ( g b y x D g b y x D ≥ ′ . Inputs are also assumed to be freely disposable, i.e., 
) ; , , ( ) ; , , (  then    if g b y x D g b y x D x x ≥ ′ ≥ ′  and, hence, monotonicity on the inputs Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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is imposed by the restrictions in (v). This is done at the mean level of data. The 
translation property in (7) is ensured by the restrictions in (vi) and, finally, the 
restrictions in (vii) impose symmetry. 
 
5.3  Tests concerning variability in MACs 
Once the parameters of the directional output distance function are estimated, 
shadow prices of bad outputs can be calculated for each individual plant, k , in 
each period, t , by applying the shadow-pricing formula in (11). This also means 
that MACs for a particular bad output can be compared between plants. To 
establish whether these costs vary significantly between plants, non-parametric 
tests can be performed. Independent of time, the Kruskal-Wallis H  statistic is 
used to test the null hypothesis that the MAC samples of two different plants are 
drawn from the same population, and the alternative that they are not. The test 
procedure is repeated for every possible two-plant combination in the study. The 
Kruskal-Wallis statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-square under the null 
hypothesis with, in this case, one degree of freedom.
12  
 
Calculating shadow prices of bad outputs also makes it possible to parametrically 
test hypotheses of why the MAC of a particular bad output varies between plants. 
















j p q  is the previously calculated MAC of the  th j :  bad output in terms 
of the  th m:  good output, Ζ is a vector of variables for region r  in period t, 
while  k ρ  and  t ψ  represent plant specific fixed effects and time specific effects, 
respectively. The fixed effects are modeled by plant dummies to capture the 
effects from factors provided by the Environment Protection Act and considered 
                                                 
12 For a detailed description of the Kruskal-Wallis test, see, e.g., Mendenhall et al. (1990, pp. 697-
702). Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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by the NLBEP when granting maximally allowed emission levels, i.e., each 
plant’s technological possibilities to abate and the sensitivity to emissions in the 
affected surrounding environment.
13, 14 The last term on the right-hand side, ε , is 
an error term that is uncorrelated with all other right-hand side variables and 
uncorrelated in time and across plants. The parameters to be estimated are φ , ζ , 
k ρ , where  K k ,..., 2 = , and  t ψ , where  T t ,..., 2 = . 
 
6 DATA 
The directional output distance function is estimated using data on the Swedish 
pulp and paper industry gathered by Statistics Sweden and the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency. The data set available is an unbalanced panel 
that contains annual information on eleven plants producing sulfate pulp and one 
plant producing sulfite pulp. It extends over the period 1983-1990 with a total of 
86 observations. To produce the good output, pulp,  1 y , each plant is assumed to 
use four inputs; wood fiber,  1 x , labor,  2 x , electricity,  3 x , and capital,  4 x . The 
capital stock is approximated using a perpetual inventory method based on 
information about investment in machinery and buildings.
15 Bad outputs are 
oxygen-demanding substances,  1 b , and suspended solids,  2 b . The former is 
collected as discharges of biological (BOD) and chemical (COD) oxygen demand. 
However, since BOD is a subset of COD, the emissions of BOD are converted 
into COD by using the conversion factor 3.5.
16 Descriptive statistics for the inputs 
and outputs are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
For the purpose of testing hypotheses regarding the variability of MACs, in 
accordance with equation (14), some additional information is needed. This 
                                                 
13 An alternative to the fixed effects would be to model random effects. However, the random 
effects model was rejected in this case since the fixed effects model explains the variability of the 
MAC variable to a much greater extent. 
14 Region dummies that capture effects from omitted variables belonging to vector Z are not 
included. The reason is that for some regions there are data available on only one plant. This 
means that the fixed and the region effects cannot be separated since they both are captured, and 
controlled for, by the plant dummy coefficients, ρk. 
15 See, e.g., Berndt (1996). 
16 The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (1990). Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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information concerns variables that are motivated by the argument that they may 
influence economic policy, which also should involve the environment. To start 
with, environmental quality is a normal good and income is relatively high in 
Sweden. This should be reflected in a relatively high demand for environmental 
quality, possibly varying across counties due to differences in income. Higher 
income allows people to financially support, and/or actively commit to, 
environmental movements. Also, higher income allows people to spend more time 
on environmental activities on their own, e.g., trying to influence the 
environmental authority that handles and grants the pulp plants’ emission permits. 
The hypothesis tested is, therefore, whether the county tax base per resident, 
Rtaxbase,
17 is positively correlated with the pulp plants’ MACs, which reflect the 
stringency of environmental regulation. The county population density, Rpopdens, 
will also be included since regional, or point, emissions harm more people the 
higher the density near the polluting source. The hypothesis tested is whether 
there is a positive correlation between population density and pulp plants’ MACs. 
Pressure from the people possibly affects the authority to grant lower maximally 
allowed emission levels, leading to higher MACs. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis will focus on variables that describe the regional labor 
market. If the pulp plant in review is located in a high unemployment area, locally 
committed politicians may argue that society benefits from less stringent 
environmental regulation, if it implies that the plant can maintain, or even 
increase, the employment rate. Therefore, the hypothesis tested is whether there is 
a negative correlation between the county unemployment rate, RUE, and pulp 
plants’ MACs, indicating laxer environmental regulation when RUE increases. 
Finally, an employment variable is included. If the pulp and paper industry 
employs a relatively large number of people in the county, it is relatively 
important to its economy. In this case not only the plant and industry 
representatives can be expected to act protective in favor of the plant in review, 
but also local politicians. The hypothesis tested is whether there is a negative 
correlation between industry employment, RIE, and pulp plants’ MACs, i.e., 
whether a laxer environmental policy is pursued as RIE increases. The data on the 
                                                 
17 The tax base is defined as added income minus pension fee and basic allowance. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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variables at the county level are published in Statistics Sweden’s annual statistics 
and descriptive statistics are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
7 RESULTS 
The system of equations in (13) is estimated using mean normalized input and 
output data. By the quadratic flexible functional form of the objective function 
and the imposed restrictions, the estimated directional output distance function 
satisfies the theoretical properties that are imposed on the production technology. 
Its parameter estimates are provided in Table A3 in the Appendix.  
 
To obtain shadow prices, or MACs, of bad outputs, the distance function is 
differentiated with respect to output variables in accordance with the shadow-
pricing formula in (11). These calculations generate MAC estimates for all of the 
86 observations. Table 1 provides the correlation coefficients between estimated 
MACs of emissions in units of pulp,  1 p q , emissions per unit produced pulp, 
1 y b , and estimated technical output efficiency scores,  ) (⋅ D .
18 
 
Table 1  Correlation coefficients 
 
  q1/p1 q 2/p1 b 1/y1 b 2/y1 D(.) 
q1/p1  1.000      
q2/p1  -0.617 1.000       
b1/y1  -0.602 -0.499  1.000     
b2/y1  -0.243 -0.013  0.212  1.000   
D(.)  -0.181 0.305 0.226 0.007 1.000 
 
The coefficient reflecting the correlation between oxygen-demanding substances, 
1 1 y b , and its shadow price,  1 1 p q , has the expected negative sign. This is also 
confirmed for suspended solids,  1 2 y b , and its shadow price,  1 2 p q . Translating 
the interpretation made in Reig-Martínetz et al. (2001), plants that produce a 
greater quantity of emissions per unit pulp are probably those relying on technical 
                                                 
18 Descriptive statistics of these variables are provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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equipment less adapted to minimizing their emergence.
19 Therefore, investments 
to reduce emissions have a relatively small cost in comparison with their yields, in 
terms of reduced sales of pulp. This is reflected in lower shadow prices, or MACs, 
of bad outputs. Furthermore, when  1 1 p q  increases then  1 2 p q  decreases, which, 
together with the correlation coefficients commented on above, shows that plants 
increase  1 2 y b  when reducing  1 1 y b . This contradicts the positive correlation 
coefficient, 0.212, in Table 1. However, when regressing  1 2 y b  on  1 1 y b , 
together with dummies capturing fixed effects from plants differing in, e.g., 
output mixes, a significant and negative sign indicates that  1 2 y b  increases when 
1 1 y b  is decreased. Furthermore,  ) (⋅ D  is positively correlated with both  1 1 y b  
and  1 2 y b , which indicates that when plants increase technical efficiency by 
moving towards the technology frontier, i.e., when  ) (⋅ D  decreases, they reduce 
emissions per unit produced pulp. Additionally,  ) (⋅ D  is negatively correlated with 
1 1 p q , which indicates that plants increase efficiency in such a way that the 
MACs are increased. However, this is not the case concerning the relationship to 
1 2 p q , where the correlation coefficient is positive, indicating that MACs 
decrease when plants become more efficient. This is another indication of plants 
increasing  1 2 y b  when reducing  1 1 y b , which also, possibly, is confirmed by 
descriptive statistics in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
Table 2 provides arithmetic averages for each plants’ relative shadow prices of 
mean normalized oxygen-demanding substances,  1 1 p q , and suspended solids, 
1 2 p q , as well as absolute shadow prices per ton oxygen-demanding substances, 
1 q , and suspended solids,  2 q . Values at mean of the data are also provided. 
 
                                                 
19 Reig-Martínez et al. (2001) apply a Shephard output distance function approach. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table 2  Shadow prices of bad outputs (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 








1  0.092 (0.016)  2755.1 (474.6)  0.001 (0.001)  530.2 (302.8) 
2  0.178 (0.077)  5344.1 (2319.1) 0.0004 (0.0002) 238.5 (94.7) 
3  0.284 (0.010)  8549.3 (302.1)  0.001 (0.0002)  366.2 (100.3) 
4  0.293 (0.022)  8832.5 (653.4)  0.0004 (0.0002) 224.8 (124.9) 
5  0.209 (0.013)  6276.7 (379.9)  0.002 (0.0004)  876.9 (248.5) 
6  0.316 (0.033)  9505.1 (1001.5) 0.0005 (0.0004) 265.3 (203.9) 
7  0.200 (0.029)  6027.1 (876.8)  0.0004 (0.0002) 263.1 (137.0) 
8  0.053 (0.046)  1583.6 (1398.3) 0.001 (0.002)  827.3 (904.4) 
9  0.030 (0.023)  898.0 (692.1)  0.004 (0.001)  2214.8 (354.3) 
10  0.177 (0.014)  5314.2 (429.8)  0.0004 (0.0003) 230.7 (194.5) 
11  0.143 (0.012)  4313.7 (348.8)  0.003 (0.001)  1689.5 (364.7) 
12  0.093 (0.009)  2792.8 (282.4)  0.003 (0.0002)  1674.1 (88.4) 
Average  0.168 (0.097)  5068.0 (2909.6) 0.001 (0.001)  793.8 (749.6) 
At mean  0.161 4844.7  0.001 583.4 
 
The estimated relative shadow prices can be interpreted as MACs in terms of 
mean normalized units of reduced pulp,  1 y . When reducing emissions of  1 b  by 
one unit, the ‘at the mean’ producing plant diverted resources that could have 
been used to produce 0.161 units of  1 y . The corresponding figure for  2 b  is 0.001. 
In this case, one unit of  1 y = 255.5 thousand tons,  1 b = 34.9 thousand tons, and 
2 b = 1.8 thousand tons. However, shadow prices can be transformed as to count 
for original units, resulting in the relative shadow price of  1 b , 0.161*(255.5/34.9) 
= 1.179, and of  2 b , 0.001*(255.5/1.8) = 0.142. These relative shadow prices can 
further be multiplied with the mean price of  1 y , 4110.3 SEK/ton (1990 constant 
prices), to obtain absolute shadow prices of  1 b  and  2 b .
20 Consequently, the price 
of  1 b  is 4844.7 SEK/ton and the price of  2 b  is 583.4 SEK/ton. The corresponding 
sample averages are 5068.0 and 793.8 SEK/ton, respectively. Note that  1 1 p q  is 
                                                 
20 It is assumed that pulp, y1, is sold on a perfectly competitive market. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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generally higher than  1 2 p q , which could be due to  1 b  being more stringently 
regulated than  2 b  and that, as earlier conjectured, plants increase  2 b  when 
decreasing  1 b .  
 
Furthermore, as seen from Table 2, the shadow prices of bad outputs seem to vary 
across plants. This is also confirmed by the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests 
provided in Appendix, Tables A4a and A4b. Each plant is compared to all other 
plants, one by one, and concerning  1 1 p q  they differ in roughly 82 percent of the 
cases. For  1 2 p q  the figure is about 61 percent. To investigate which factors that 
possibly cause MACs to vary, a fixed effects model, in accordance with equation 
(14), is applied. The hypotheses tested are related to variables that vary across 
counties; unemployment in proportion to the labor force, RUE, employment in the 
pulp and paper industry (SNI 34) in proportion to total employment, RIE, tax base 
per resident, Rtaxbase, and population density, Rpopdens. The parameter 
estimates of the finally chosen model specifications and their corresponding t-
values are displayed in Table 3.
21  
 
At the 5 percent significance level only one of the variables that vary between 
counties contributes to the variability of  1 1 p q . The estimated coefficient for 
Rpopdens shows a negative sign, which contradicts the tested hypothesis. People 
possibly experience utility from the industry operating in the county that 
outweighs the negative influences from emissions of oxygen-demanding 
substances. 
                                                 
21 F-statistics have been calculated to test the joint effect from the time dummy variables.  In the 
case of explaining the variability of q2/p1, time effects were rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level. A time trend hypothesis was also tested and rejected. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table 3  The fixed effects models explaining relative shadow prices of mean 
normalized oxygen-demanding substances, q1/p1, and suspended solids, q2/p1 
 
 Dependent  variable,  q1/p1 Dependent  variable,  q2/p1 
Coefficient Variable  Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
φ  intercept  1.3801 2.5382  -0.0052  -0.9553 
ζ1  RIE  -1.2006 -0.6003 -0.1059 -2.6313 
ζ2  RUE  -0.2811 -0.2630 -0.0036 -0.2124 
ζ3  Rtaxbase  -0.8595 -1.4515 -0.0058 -1.5706 
ζ4  Rpopdens  -0.0228 -2.6309  0.0003  2.2192 
ρ2  plant 2  -0.1592 -1.3932  0.0063  2.8468 
ρ3  plant 3  0.1593 3.7874 0.0023 2.9371 
ρ4  plant 4  -0.1437 -0.8690  0.0096  3.1564 
ρ5  plant 5  -0.2286 -1.3826  0.0107  3.5266 
ρ6  plant 6  -0.1097 -0.6620  0.0096  3.1581 
ρ7  plant 7  -0.2332 -1.4102  0.0097  3.1757 
ρ8  plant 8  -0.4303 -2.2676  0.0126  3.4642 
ρ9  plant 9  -0.4530 -2.3876  0.0150  4.1252 
ρ10  plant 10  -0.4724 -1.8218  0.0119  2.3904 
ρ11  plant 11  0.4648 3.0176  -0.0018  -0.8299 
ρ12  plant 12  0.2115 2.6946 0.0011 0.8117 
ψ84  1984  0.0010  0.0856     -     - 
ψ85  1985  0.0146  0.8911     -     - 
ψ86  1986  0.0579  1.7366     -     - 
ψ87  1987  0.0865  1.6360     -     - 
ψ88  1988  0.1018  1.6844     -     - 
ψ89  1989  0.1477  1.9147     -     - 
ψ90  1990  0.1616  2.2063     -     - 
Adjusted R-squared  0.9392 0.8345 
Number of observations  86 86 
 
Regarding  1 2 p q  there are two county variables that significantly explain its 
variability. The variable RIE reflects the size of the pulp and paper industry, and 
the estimated coefficient shows a negative sign. In accordance with the formulated 
hypothesis, the larger the industry the more successful the plant and the industry 
representatives are in affecting the regulatory authority to grant higher maximally 
allowed emission levels of suspended solids, leading to lower MACs. Also, Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
23 
politicians may argue for relatively lax environmental regulation in their efforts to 
maintain the positive dynamic effects the industry has on the regional economy. 
Furthermore, the positive influence of Rpopdens on  1 2 p q  confirms the tested 
hypothesis. People feel uncomfortable with emissions of suspended solids, and the 




Finally, it is evident from Table 3 that a larger part of the plant dummy 
coefficients are significant, which indicates that the regulatory authority, guided 
by the Environment Protection Act, accounted for differences in plants’ 
possibilities of abating and the sensitivity to emissions in the affected surrounding 
environment, when granting emission permits. However, since county dummies 
are excluded the plant dummies may also capture county specific effects from 
variables that vary across counties and that are not being modeled. 
 
8  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to compute and evaluate shadow prices of bad 
outputs. The background is that many types of human activities have negative side 
effects on the environment. These effects may be due to produced bad outputs, 
i.e., undesirable by-products from different production processes. Therefore, to 
limit the environmental damages, public authorities are called upon to regulate the 
performance of polluters. If the regulations force producers to increase the 
sharpness of their abatement efforts, they also face increased abatement costs that 
can be studied. For instance, computed shadow prices, i.e., marginal abatement 
costs (MACs) of bad outputs, can be used to find out which factors that influence 
the regulatory authority’s stringency of environmental regulations to be imposed 
on polluters.  
 
In this paper, the Swedish pulp and paper industry during 1983-1990 is being 
studied. To limit its emission into the water, the regulatory authority, which by 
                                                 
22 One explanation to why RUE does not contribute significantly to the variability of the MACs 
may be that there were no substantial unemployment during the sample period. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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law was prescribed to consider the polluters’ technological possibilities of abating 
and the sensitivity to emissions in the affected surrounding environment, granted 
each producing plant permits that specify maximally allowed emission levels. 
However, during the handling of each such case, area residents and other parties 
concerned were allowed to express their views, which possibly introduced 
additional factors which may influence the amount of finally granted permits and, 
therefore, the MACs. This paper seeks the answer to whether also regional 
differences in, e.g., economical characteristics, were important when the authority 
restricted 12 geographically scattered pulp plants with respect to emissions. 
 
As a first step, shadow prices, reflecting MACs of oxygen-demanding substances 
and suspended solids, are computed for each pulp plant and compared to each 
other through non-parametric tests. These tests reveal that MACs vary 
significantly between plants. The approach adopted to compute these prices 
originates from Färe et al. (2002). The model is founded on production theory, 
where technology is represented by the directional output distance function, from 
which the shadow prices are derived. The distance function is specified using a 
quadratic flexible functional form and estimated by a linear programming 
technique. In a second step, the computed MACs are regressed on a set of 
variables in an attempt to explain their variation across plants. Hypotheses 
concerning variables such as regional tax base and population density, and 
variables describing the situation on the regional labor market, are suggested. 
Also fixed and time specific effects are modeled. The fixed effects are included to 
capture the effects from factors prescribed by environmental law, such as 
differences across plants regarding technological possibilities to abate, and the 
sensitivity to emissions in the affected surroundings, where each plant is located. 
 
The result indicates that there are regional factors, not regulated by environmental 
law, which may influence the actually pursued environmental policy. For 
instance, the larger the relative size of the pulp and paper industry in the county 
the lower the MAC of suspended solids for plants located in that county. This 
indicates that these plants were targets of laxer environmental regulation. Also, a 
higher county population density seems to have created opportunities for people 
to influence the actual policy pursued. This study shows that population density Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
25 
had a different influence on the two types of emissions. In the case of oxygen-
demanding substances, the density contributed negatively to the plants’ MACs, 
indicating that plants located in counties with higher density were targets of laxer 
environmental regulation. On the other hand, in the case of suspended solids, the 
density contributed positively to the plants, MACs. That is, plants located in 
counties with higher population density were more stringently regulated. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
26 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1  Definitions and mean statistics for variables included as arguments 
in the directional output distance function (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 

















































































































1983-1990  Variable 
mean min max 
y1  255.5 
(140.9) 
61.0 597.6 
b1  34.9 
(28.0) 
1.1 111.2 
b2  1.8 
(2.8) 
0.1 15.0 
x1  1340.4 
(624.3) 
313.9 2588.0
x2  672.2 
(314.7) 
184.0 1365.0
x3  210.4 
(114.9) 
25.4 458.3 




y1 = pulp, 1000 tons 
b1 = oxygen-demanding substances, 1000 tons 
b2 = suspended solids, 1000 tons 
x1 = wood fiber, 1000 m
3 
x2= labor, 1000 hours worked 
x3 = electricity, Mwh 
x4 = capital, millions SEK (1990 constant price) Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table A2  Definitions and mean statistics for variables that appear in the result 
section (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 

















































































































































































1983-1990  Variable 
mean min max 
q1/p1  0.168 
(0.097) 
0.000 0.351 
q2/p1  0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 0.004 
b1/y1  0.955 
(0.625) 
0.103 3.597 
b2/y1  0.913 
(1.108) 
0.069 5.777 
D(.)  0.027 
(0.033) 
0.000 0.132 
RIE  0.037 
(0.013) 
0.015 0.054 
RUE  0.030 
(0.013) 
0.009 0.066 
Rtaxbase  0.680 
(0.070) 
0.542 0.867 
Rpopdens  22.558 
(13.720) 
3.000 52.000 
q1  5068.0 
(2909.6) 
0.000 10556.0




q1/p1 = relative shadow price of mean normalized oxygen-demanding substances 
in terms of forgone mean normalized units of pulp Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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q2/p1 = relative shadow price of mean normalized suspended solids in terms of 
forgone mean normalized units of pulp 
b1/y1 = emissions of mean normalized oxygen-demanding substances per mean 
normalized unit produced pulp 





m;1,-1)  = estimated technical output efficiency scores for mean 
normalized input and output quantities (the top index m denotes the variable at 
mean) 
RIE = employment in the pulp and paper industry (SNI 34) in proportion to total 
employment in the county 
RUE = number of unemployed in proportion to the number of people in the 
county labor force 
Rtaxbase = tax base in the county, 1000 SEK per resident (1990 constant prices) 
Rpopdens = residents per km
2 in the county 
q1  = absolute shadow price of one ton oxygen-demanding substances (1990 
constant price) 
q2 = absolute shadow price of one ton suspended solids (1990 constant price) Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table A3  Parameter estimates of the directional output distance function when 
inputs and outputs are mean normalized
23 
 
Coefficient Variable  Estimate Coefficient Variable  Estimate 
α0  intercept  -0.3118  δ21  x2y1  -0.1976 
α1  x1  0.3139  η21  x2b1  -0.1962 
α2  x2  -0.2946  η22  x2b2  -0.0015 
α3  x3  0.2599  α33  x3x3  -0.2684 
α4  x4  0.5114  α34  x3x4  0.3575 
β1  y1  -0.7182  δ31  x3y1  -0.0668 
γ1  b1  0.2818  η31  x3b1  -0.0636 
γ2  b2  0.0001  η32  x3b2  -0.0031 
α11  x1x1  -1.1588  α44  x4x4  -0.0688 
α12  x1x2  0.8567  δ41  x4y1  0.1081 
α13  x1x3  0.6148  η41  x4b1  0.1079 
α14  x1x4  -0.3391  η42  x4b2  0.0001 
δ11  x1y1  0.0454  β11  y1y1  -0.0157 
η11  x1b1  0.0439  µ11  y1b1  -0.0178 
η12  x1b2  0.0015  µ12  y1b2  0.0021 
α22  x2x2  0.8405  γ11  b1b1  -0.0198 
α23  x2x3  -0.4172  γ12  b1b2  0.0020 
α24  x2x4  -0.5901  γ22  b2b2  0.0001 
 
y1 = pulp, 255.5 thousand tons 
b1 = oxygen-demanding substances, 34.9 thousand tons 
b2 = suspended solids, 1.8 thousand tons 
x1 = wood fiber, 1340.4 thousand m
3 
x2 = labor, 672.2 thousand hours worked 
x3 = electricity, 210.4 Mwh 
x4 = capital, 2096.6 millions SEK (1990 constant price) 
                                                 
23 The estimates of the plant and time specific effects are left out. Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table A4a  The Kruskal-Wallis Test: Comparing shadow prices of oxygen-
demanding substances between plants (bold type indicates that the null-hypothesis 
cannot be rejected) 
 
Plant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12 
1    10.50 10.50 11.29 11.29 9.60  9.60  2.48  10.60 10.50 9.60  0.01 
2    5.00  7.09  1.93  6.61  1.65  9.76 10.50 1.47 0.02 9.80 
3     0.34  10.50 4.00 9.00 10.50 10.50 9.80 9.00 9.80 
4      11.29 1.35  9.60 11.29 11.29 10.50  9.60 10.50
5       9 . 6 0   1.07  11.29 11.29 9.05 9.60 10.50
6        8.31  9.60  9.60  9.00  8.31  9.00 
7         9.60  9.60  2.94  8.31 9.00 
8          0.62  10.50 9.60  1.93 
9           10.50  9.60  10.50
10            8 . 1 6   9 . 8 0  
11             0.74 
12              
 
H0: the shadow prices of oxygen-demanding substances, q1/p1, for the two 
compared plants, are drawn from the same population 
HA: the shadow prices of oxygen-demanding substances, q1/p1, for the two 
compared plants, are not drawn from the same population 
χ
2 (1).05 = 3.84  Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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Table A4b  The Kruskal-Wallis Test: Comparing shadow prices of suspended 
solids between plants (bold type indicates that the null-hypothesis cannot be 
rejected) 
 
Plant  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11  12 
1   3.87  2.63  4.41 4.41 3.50 3.27 0.01 11.29 4.34 9.60 10.50
2    5.00  0.00  10.50 0.08 0.18 1.09 10.50 0.04  9.00 9.80 
3     4.84  10.50 0.18 1.65 0.12 10.50 1.80  9.00 9.80 
4      11.29 0.42 0.42 0.71 11.29 0.00  9.60 10.50
5       9.60  9.60  0.71  11.29 10.50 8.82  10.50
6        0.03 0.27 9.60  0.33  8.31 9.00 
7         0.42  9.60  0.08  8.31 9.00 
8          8 . 0 4   0.34 2.02 1.62 
9           10.50  5.40  6.48 
10            9 . 0 0   9 . 8 0  
11             9 . 0 0  
12              
 
H0: the shadow prices of suspended solids, q2/p1, for the two compared plants, are 
drawn from the same population 
HA: the shadow prices of suspended solids, q2/p1, for the two compared plants, are 
not drawn from the same population 
χ
2 (1).05 = 3.84 
 Analyzing Interplant Marginal Abatement Cost Differences …. 
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